Seafarer Tax Exemption
A Seafarer Lost His Case Despite the Law Being on His Side. How a Defective Application Closed the Door to Relief
The judgment of the Regional Administrative Court (WSA) in Gdańsk of 18 February 2026 (I SA/Gd 951/25) should become required reading for every seafarer filing an application for limitation of advance PIT payments. Not because the court developed a new line of case law – but because it shows how a seafarer with a potentially winning set of facts can lose a case solely through procedural errors.
Mr M. D. worked on a Cyprus-flagged vessel (an EU Member State) operating in international shipping, managed by an enterprise with its registered office in the United Kingdom. He performed the carriage of cargo. He planned to work more than 183 days in the year. At first glance – a textbook candidate for the PIT exemption under Art. 21(1)(23c) of the PIT Act, or at the very least for abolition relief under Art. 27g of the PIT Act.
And yet he lost. At both instances and before the court.
First Mistake: Wrong Legal Basis in the Application
The appellant filed an application for limitation of advance PIT payments for 2025, relying exclusively on the exemption under Art. 21(1)(23c) of the PIT Act. This provision exempts from tax the income of seafarers working on EU/EEA-flagged vessels used for the carriage of cargo or passengers in international shipping, provided a minimum of 183 days’ work in the year and subject to the certificate requirement.
The problem was that the appellant failed to demonstrate the probability that the cumulative conditions of this exemption were met. He did not provide documentary evidence that the vessel would be used for the carriage of cargo in 2025 – despite asserting as much in the application. He did not submit the certificate required by Art. 21(35)(2) of the PIT Act. And the 183-day condition could not yet be demonstrated – the application was filed in February.
Meanwhile – as the representative noticed only at the appeal stage – another instrument could have applied: abolition relief under Art. 27g of the PIT Act read with the Polish-UK Convention. The vessel operated in international shipping on behalf of a UK-managed enterprise – and that would have opened the door through Art. 14(3) of the Convention.
But it was too late.
The Application Defines the Scope of the Proceedings – the Authority Does Not Investigate Ex Officio
The WSA confirmed the position of the Director of the Tax Administration Chamber in Gdańsk, which is critical for understanding the procedural rules of the game: the taxpayer’s application defines the scope of the proceedings for limitation of advance payments. Since the appellant relied on Art. 21(1)(23c) of the PIT Act, the first-instance authority was competent to assess only the conditions of that provision – and that provision alone. It had no obligation to examine ex officio whether the taxpayer was entitled to abolition relief under Art. 27g.
Moreover, the appellate authority cannot, at the appeal stage, take into account a modification of the application – and the attempt to “broaden” the legal basis in the appeal was treated as precisely such an inadmissible modification.
The court also rejected the appellant’s argument that the authority should itself have “reclassified” the application under Art. 122 and 191 of the Tax Ordinance Act. While the authority is indeed obliged to seek material truth, the proceedings for limitation of advance payments do not involve a full evidentiary procedure. These are taxpayer-initiated proceedings, based on the taxpayer’s declaration of knowledge and intent, requiring the applicant’s particular engagement.
In practical terms: if a seafarer invokes the wrong provision in the application, the authority will refuse – and the court will accept this. The only recourse is then to file a new, correctly formulated application.
Second Mistake: Documentation Deficiencies
Even within the framework of Art. 21(1)(23c), the appellant failed to provide documents sufficient to demonstrate the probability that the conditions were met. It is worth tracing what was missing – as the catalogue constitutes an instructive case study for every seafarer preparing an application.
No shipowner’s certificate under Art. 21(35)(2) of the PIT Act – the provision requires a document containing the seafarer’s name, PESEL number, number of days worked on board with employment dates, vessel name and flag, income amount, and full shipowner details. This is a document that should accompany every application based on the Art. 21(1)(23c) exemption.
No documents confirming the vessel’s use – the appellant claimed that the vessel performed the carriage of cargo in international shipping but submitted no evidence to that effect. A cargo manifest and freight invoice were attached only to the appeal – too late and in the form of uncertified copies.
English-language documents without translation – the court expressly stated that documents in a foreign language “cannot be subject to evaluation.” This is seemingly obvious, yet in practice is surprisingly often overlooked by seafarers and their representatives.
Uncertified copies – the Director of the Tax Administration Chamber noted that the documents submitted with the appeal “are not original documents but copies that have not been certified as true copies.” This is another seemingly minor, yet in practice decisive, detail.
Detailed requirements on documentation are discussed in our article on the verification of seafarers’ tax settlements.
Third Issue: Electronic Service and the PURDE Platform
A side issue, but practically relevant. The appellant’s representative failed to respond to the first-instance authority’s summons, attributing this to technical problems with the PURDE platform (Public Registered Electronic Delivery Service). He argued that the authority – aware of the platform’s problems – should have made telephone contact (Art. 155 and 144 of the Tax Ordinance Act).
The argument convinced neither the authority nor the court. The burden of demonstrating probability rests on the taxpayer. If the representative is unable to receive correspondence via PURDE, they should take active steps – contact the authority independently, submit documents directly, flag the problem. Passively waiting for the authority to reach out is not a litigation strategy.
PIT Exemption (Art. 21(1)(23c)) vs. Abolition Relief (Art. 27g) – Which to Choose?
The judgment exposed a problem faced by many seafarers: Polish tax law offers two separate tax pathways for seafarers working abroad, and the choice between them has fundamental consequences.
Art. 21(1)(23c) of the PIT Act – full PIT exemption. Requires: an EU/EEA flag, carriage of cargo or passengers in international shipping, a minimum of 183 working days in the year, and the certificate under Art. 21(35). Additional complication: the amended wording of the provision (citizenship of an EU/EEA state instead of flag) formally awaits a European Commission decision on state aid compatibility – until then, the older version requiring an EU/EEA flag applies.
Art. 27g of the PIT Act – abolition relief. Requires: settlement of foreign income under Art. 27(9) or (9a) (proportional credit method), which in turn requires the applicability of a double taxation treaty providing for this method – or a treaty-free situation. Unlimited for income from work outside the land territory (Art. 27g(5)).
Mr M. D. potentially had both pathways open to him. He chose the first – but failed to demonstrate the probability that its conditions were met. Had he relied alternatively (or exclusively) on Art. 27g read with the Polish-UK Convention, the proceedings might have taken a different course.
The lesson is clear: the choice of legal basis for an application for limitation of advance payments is a strategic decision that should be taken after a comprehensive analysis of the facts – vessel type, flag, area of operations, shipowner’s registered office, applicable tax convention. It is not a formality to be completed hastily before filing.
Practical Conclusions
Precision of the application is critical. The tax authority will not search ex officio for a more favourable legal basis for the taxpayer. The application defines the scope of the proceedings – an incorrectly formulated application closes the door, even if the facts would open it. When filing an application for limitation of advance payments, it is advisable to engage professional tax advisory services rather than relying on templates circulating in the seafaring community.
Documents must be complete from the outset. Demonstrating probability is not the same as proof – but it still requires credible evidentiary material, not mere declarations. The Art. 21(35) certificate, cargo manifest, seafarer employment agreement, payslips, sworn translations of English-language documents, certified copies – this is the minimum that should accompany the application. What exactly the authority requires is discussed in our article on the verification of seafarers’ settlements.
Do not wait until the appeal to supplement the application. A change of legal basis at the appeal stage is inadmissible. New documents submitted only with the appeal may be disregarded – particularly where they are uncertified copies or foreign-language documents without translation. If the application needs correction, file a new, correct application – rather than attempting to fix the old one in the appellate proceedings.
Monitor electronic service. Technical problems with the PURDE platform do not release the taxpayer or their representative from the obligation to respond to authority summonses. Failure to respond means absence of evidence – and absence of evidence means refusal.
Legal basis: WSA Gdańsk judgment of 18 February 2026, case no. I SA/Gd 951/25 (not final); Art. 22 § 2a of the Tax Ordinance Act of 29 August 1997 (Journal of Laws 2025, item 111); Art. 21(1)(23c), Art. 21(35)(2), Art. 27g, Art. 44(1a)(1) of the Personal Income Tax Act of 26 July 1991 (consolidated text: Journal of Laws 2025, item 163, as amended).
Robert Nogacki – licensed legal counsel (radca prawny, WA-9026), Founder of Kancelaria Prawna Skarbiec.
There are lawyers who practice law. And there are those who deal with problems for which the law has no ready answer. For over twenty years, Kancelaria Skarbiec has worked at the intersection of tax law, corporate structures, and the deeply human reluctance to give the state more than the state is owed. We advise entrepreneurs from over a dozen countries – from those on the Forbes list to those whose bank account was just seized by the tax authority and who do not know what to do tomorrow morning.
One of the most frequently cited experts on tax law in Polish media – he writes for Rzeczpospolita, Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, and Parkiet not because it looks good on a résumé, but because certain things cannot be explained in a court filing and someone needs to say them out loud. Author of AI Decoding Satoshi Nakamoto: Artificial Intelligence on the Trail of Bitcoin’s Creator. Co-author of the award-winning book Bezpieczeństwo współczesnej firmy (Security of a Modern Company).
Kancelaria Skarbiec holds top positions in the tax law firm rankings of Dziennik Gazeta Prawna. Four-time winner of the European Medal, recipient of the title International Tax Planning Law Firm of the Year in Poland.
He specializes in tax disputes with fiscal authorities, international tax planning, crypto-asset regulation, and asset protection. Since 2006, he has led the WGI case – one of the longest-running criminal proceedings in the history of the Polish financial market – because there are things you do not leave half-done, even if they take two decades. He believes the law is too serious to be treated only seriously – and that the best legal advice is the kind that ensures the client never has to stand before a court.
